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Abstract
  Up until recently, Japan has been widely regarded as a mono-cultural/mono-racial country, populated 
by a single ethnic group (tan’itsu minzoku). Minority groups were made invisible in public discourse until 
as recently as the 1990s, where discourses about multiculturalism (tabunka kyōsei) started to surface (Willis 
and Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008).
  Yet, in 2013, the biracial announcer Takigawa Christel was chosen as an ambassador for the 2020 
Tokyo Olympics. The speech she delivered in front of  the IOC (International Olympic Committee) was 
widely reported on Japanese media, becoming one of  the most popular news items of  the year and 
spawning the buzzword omotenashi.
  Throughout this paper I will analyze the politics behind Takigawa’s apparition in front of  the IOC. By 
analyzing her speech, I will argue that her hāfu body served as the perfect vessel for an ideological stance 
that Japanese institutions have been trying to propagate domestically and abroad. Through the intersection 
of  familiar discourses such as “Cool Japan,” multiculturalism and nihonjinron-style cultural nationalism, 
the announcer’s speech recreates a (self)-orientalistic (Iwabuchi, 1994) image meant to captivate the hearts 
of  the global public. Japan as embodied by the biracial body of  Takigawa Christel is a nation whose 
driving force is a tension between the “old” and the “new”, the “oriental traditions” and “newfangled 
modernity”. It is a nation of  hybridity, much like the speaker herself. It is my intention to show the ways in 
which the announcer became the vessel for a new type of  nationalism, one that is incredibly well matched 
with the desire for consumption of  national images in an incredibly globalized world. 
Keywords: Hāfu, Mixed-race, Nationalism, 2020 Tokyo Olympics, Orientalism
In the days between the 6th and the 10th of  September, 2013, representatives from Japan, Spain and Turkey 
assembled in Buenos Aires, Argentina, for the 125th session of  the International Olympics Committee (hereafter 
IOC). The three states were competing to host the 2020 Summer Olympics.
Among the Japanese representatives ﬁgured a well-known media ﬁgure: former Fuji Television Announcer 
Takigawa Christel, who was invited to participate as “Cool Tokyo” Ambassador. Viewers from Japan had the 
chance to see the newscaster, born from a French father and a Japanese mother, deliver her speech in perfect 
1 This manuscript uses last name-ﬁrst name order for Japanese names.
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French. 
Takigawa’s presentation received considerable media exposure, and it popularized the buzzword 
omotenashi (hospitality), which won the Buzzword award of  that year (Hufﬁngton Post Japan, 2013). Not only 
that: the speech is also widely credited by prominent businessmen such as Sony former president Chūbachi 
Ryūji for helping Japan win the bid for hosting the 2020 Olympics (Nikkei Business Online, 2017; Sankei Biz, 
2013).
Since she has no relation with either sports or politics, one might have found it surprising to see her on the 
stage. I will argue that the announcer’s hāfu body was used as a powerful ideological tool in the race for the 
Olympics – one that was arguably more powerful domestically than internationally. 
Nationalism, Globalization and the hybrid body
Questions of  inter/nationalism have been a staple feature of  Japan’s post-war political discourses. In this 
section I will brieﬂy summarize how nationalism (and inter-nationalism) have intersected with and participated 
in the construction of  discourses about ethnic-racial hybridity.
Following the loss of  the overseas territories in China, Korea and Taiwan, redefining the nation’s 
boundaries was considered a major task during the period that succeeded the Second World War. It was once 
again necessary to ﬁnd a convincing answer to the question “what is Japan”, and this was logically followed by 
an intellectual quest to deﬁne the qualities of  the Japanese people.
It is in this period that the topoi of  Japanese insularity and Japanese mono-ethnicity started to emerge. 
Crafted as an antidote to the “multiethnic” (ta-minzoku) expansionism of  the Japanese empire, the discourse of  
Japan as an ethnically homogeneous (tan’itsu minzoku) nation began to take hold on society (Kawai, 2015). 
Postwar Japan wasn’t, of  course, an ethnically homogenous society. Many internal boundaries existed (and 
still do), ranging from the Ainu minorities in the northern regions of  Hokkaido to the marginalized burakumin, 
and the communities of  zainichi Koreans that decided to remain in the country well after 1945. Nevertheless, the 
ethnic-racial homogeneity of  its inhabitants was a powerful rhetorical device during the postwar reconstruction 
of  the national image2. 
It is no wonder that in the ﬁrst 20 years following the war, “mixed race”3 was perceived as a pressing social 
issue. Up until the sixties mixophobia (Taguieff, 2001) characterized the discourses surrounding inter-racial 
mixing. The picture painted in the media was that of  children born out of  illicit relationships with men in the 
US army, if  not from violence (Horiguchi and Imoto, 2014). Thus, the images of  konketsuji (literally “mixed-
blood” children) were intertwined to that of  defeat in the war and of  subjugation, through Japanese women’s 
bodies, from an external enemy. “Mixed race” as a social problem was debated through questions such as the 
position of  these children in Japanese society, as well as the (im)possibility of  integration (Horiguchi and Imoto, 
2014; Shimoji, 2018) .
The ﬁrst major shift in the perception of  mixed race happened in the 1970s, with the transition from what 
Ifekwunigwe (2004) deﬁnes as an “Age of  Pathology” to something more akin to an “Age of  Celebration”. It 
was during this period that the more positive sounding English loanword hāfu started to replace konketsuji.
Originating in media discourses, the term initially referred to individuals of  white origin, most often 
women (Iwabuchi, 2014: 11-12), who were associated with characteristics such as beauty and desirableness4. 
2 For an overview to the individual contestations to national discourse of  homogeneity, cfr. Murphy-Shigematsu 2000.
3 The question of  how to refer to racial hybridity is a hotly debated one. I will here follow Ifekwunigwe (2004) and use 
the hyphenated term “mixed race” as an umbrella term that refers to individuals born from parents belonging to 
different racial groups.
4 These discourses are not completely new: “mixed-race” marriages with white women to better the Japanese race 
were advocated as a minority opinion in the pre-war eugenics debate. (See also Robertson 2002).
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Hāfu is nowadays the most common way to refer to “mixed race”5, and is increasingly used to refer to people 
who, racial background notwithstanding, have a foreign parent. However, the cultural history of  the term is still 
very much alive. With a few notable exceptions, media representation is still skewed towards people who have 
white origin6, and as the controversies surrounding Miss Universe Japan 2015 Miyamoto Ariana demonstrated, 
“mixed-race” people with black ancestry at times prove much more difﬁcult to accept.
Throughout the last decade the hāfu body has acquired further signiﬁcance as a symbol of  an increasingly 
globalized country. “Mixed race” citizens of  Japan are often represented as a bridge to the “outside world”, a 
precious asset to have in an age in which global interconnectivity has taken the spotlight. Paradoxically enough, 
this fascination with the “mixed race” body is not at all unrelated to the often self-orientalistic (Iwabuchi, 
1994) insistence on particularism that characterizes most Japanese discourses on the nation. The insistence 
on a Japanese cultural hybridity that mixes modernity and tradition, of  which some hāfu bodies become a 
complex symbol, is, as Friedman (1997) theorized, almost completely dependent on the widespread perception 
of  essentialistic boundaries between the self  and the other. White heritage becomes a symbol of  modern “other” 
which is non-problematically fused with the Japanese “traditional” self.
Tokyo 2020 Ambassador Takigawa Christel, can be considered a suture point between the discourses of  
“mixed race”, nationalism and globalization. Her elite biracial body was the perfect symbol for an emerging 
national rhetoric that oscillates between particularism and universalism, that has also been instrumental in the 
ideological imagining of  the upcoming Olympic tournament.
Becoming the Metropolis of  Harmony: Tokyo 2020
In 2020, Tokyo will host the Olympics for the second time since 1964, becoming the first Asian city to 
do so. The bid for hosting the sports mega-event in 2020 was not the ﬁrst: in 2009, Japan raced for hosting 
the 2016 Olympics. The candidacy was strongly wanted by the then mayor of  Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō, who 
saw the event as a catalyst for tackling “the ‘adaptation to an aging and welfare society’, ‘consideration for 
environmental problems’ and ‘sustainable city development’” (Shimizu, 2014). Japan eventually lost to Brazil, 
but Ishihara came back to charge just two years after the proposal failed. 
On June 11, 2011, just a few months after the disastrous Great Tōhoku Earthquake, Ishihara announced 
that Tokyo would make its bid to host the Olympics once again. On that same day, the diet passed a proposal to 
change the Fundamental Law on Sport: the new act emphasized a national responsibility of  sport promotion. 
As worded by Kōno Ichirō, the director of  the Japan Sport Council until September 2015, athletic disciplines 
were considered “an important strategic tool to show the existence of  a nation” (Shimizu, 2014). Thus, the bid 
for the 2020 Olympics would have full governmental support, as it was now clear that it could have been used 
as a strategic tool to present a positive image of  the country to the rest of  the world (Roche, 2000).
It has been argued that mega-events such as the Olympics have an explicit political nature. Studying the 
development of  mega-events in the 1800s and early 1900s, Roche argued that due to their “inter-national” 
nature they:
“helped to create a fragile space, something of  an ‘international public culture’, in which ‘official’ 
versions of  collective identities, particularly but not exclusively national identities, were asserted and recognised 
in an […] international ‘world of  nations’” (Roche, 2000: 22). 
The historical situation has been deeply changed since the 1800s, and nationalism now co-exists with 
globalization in a relationship that is at times complicit, whilst at other times conflictual. Nevertheless, the 
5 The term has also been the object of  criticism: some members of  the mixed-race community claim that since the 
original English word “half” implies incompleteness, the use of  the word is discriminatory. Nonetheless, it still 
remains the most widely-used term to refer to mixed-race on the national level.
6 This is especially true of  fashion and those sectors in the media that focus on beauty practices.
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Olympics have remained a site for the display of  “inter-nationalism”: it is in this light that seemingly “apolitical” 
mega-events such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics have been recently re-analyzed. In his 2011 essay, Tagsold 
described how the event offered the opportunity to recuperate the war-tainted nationalistic symbols of  the 
emperor and the national ﬂag in a benign, peaceful light, thus contributing greatly to the reconstruction of  
a nationalistic sentiment (Tagsold, 2011). Similarly, the 2020 Olympic games are animated by a deeply self-
conscious Japanese “brand nationalism” (Iwabuchi, 2007), this time centered on discourses of  “western-eastern” 
hybridity. 
The desire to show the “inter-national” aesthetic of  the “Japanese national character” in the best possible 
way was evident in the discourse centered around the word omotenashi, that has been translated in the IOC 
speech as “hospitality”. The word omotenashi, popularly associated with Takigawa as it was one of  the key 
points in her speech, has a distinctly nationalistic feel to it. It is implied to be a distinctive trait of  a Japanese 
culture that is essentially different from its “western” counterpart. Omotenashi has been deﬁned in the Japanese 
business world as the mindset that people in the service industry employ towards their clients – one that implies 
emotional tuning with the customer in order to make him or her feel at ease. Nagao and Umemuro (2012) imply 
in their deﬁnition a clear distinction between the strictly materially oriented “western” concept of  hospitality 
and the feeling-oriented omotenashi, whose origins they trace back to tea ceremony, ryokan and geisha districts. 
The announcer’s take on hospitality, presupposes a Japanese actor and a foreign receiver, taking the mirror 
games of  self  and other to the international level, making explicit the connection between the intersecting local 
and the global dimensions of  nationalism. 
Roche also recognizes a globalist aspect of  mega-events which appeal to the global, touristic consumer 
in three distinctive ways: the “speciﬁcity of  when they occur, […] the speciﬁcity of  what uniquely dramatic 
and memorable activities and experiences occur when people attend them in person, and […] the speciﬁcity of  
where they occur, namely the city that staged and ‘hosted’ them” (Roche, 2000: 26-27). Indeed, the potential 
global appeal is very highlighted in discourses surrounding the 2020 Olympics: the public is being presented 
with many innovations which are being developed in order to better accommodate the prospective tourists, 
such as foreign-language speaking robots (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2017), free wi-fi services (Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun, 2017) and so on. The citizens are also being invited to take part in the “internationalization” process 
of  the Prefectureof  Tokyo through volunteer activities such as translator or guide services (Tokyo Volunteer 
Navigator, n.d.). 
What is surprising about the 2020 Olympic discourse is that the international discussion about it was 
radically different from the discussion nationally, as it was mostly focused on environmental problems 
and possibilities. Whereas it is not rare in Japan to hear that Takigawa’s internationalist contribution was 
signiﬁcant in winning the race to the Olympics (Uotani, 2017), overseas commentary was more focused on prime 
minister Abe Shinzo’s speech about the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the narrative of  a “safe capital city” 
which would not be affected in the slightest (BBC Sport, 2013; Longman, Fackler, 2013). 
The national narrative surrounding the Olympic Games is consistent with Roche’s interpretation that 
mega-events “project the image and status of  the local power elite which produced the event for the city’s 
public” (Roche, 2000: 10). In a time in which Japan’s elite is rushing to globalize, it is perfectly understandable 
that they would insist on the multiculturalism-globalism-internationalization triad, making the words “Unity in 
Diversity” one of  the ideological pillars of  the 2020 Tokyo Olympics (The Tokyo Organizing Committee of  the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games, n.d.).
Takigawa Christel between “East” and “West”
According to Eriksen, globalization as a modern phenomenon exists in the acceleration of  multiple pre-
93
Elisa Ivana PELLICANÒ, Representing Japanese Hospitality: Takigawa Christel’s Speech for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics
existing processes (Eriksen 2014), among which figure communication processes, economic flows and the 
movement of  people. This last process is of  particular interest to this article, as it could be considered the main 
factor behind two very important concepts that form its theoretical background, namely what Eriksen dubs 
“mixing” and “identity politics”. 
Mixing has been one of  the theoretical keywords of  the last 30 years, gaining the spotlight in disciplines 
such as postcolonial studies and anthropology. Eriksen understands mixing as a complex phenomenon that 
can take multiple different forms whilst being able to elude strong identities and ﬁxed boundaries. It is not a 
necessarily new phenomenon, as it could be said that the cultures that are being mixed now are, to a bigger or 
lesser degree, the products of  prior cultural mixing (which might have taken place at a slower pace). However, 
it is undeniable that we are assisting an acceleration of  these processes, which is in turn generating the 
reaction that Eriksen refers to as identity politics. Identity politics seek to ﬁx identities and re-establish often 
nationalistic boundaries, whose erasure are perceived by the members of  the group as a threat (Eriksen 2014: 
158-160).
Japan might be seen as a case in point for Eriksen’s argument that “globalization does not create global 
people” (Eriksen 2014: 154). As Iwabuchi (1994) has pointed out in one of  his earlier articles, the increase of  
international exchanges mostly had the effect of  reinforcing the images of  a particularistic national identity 
constructed through dialectical relations with the “Western” and the Asian other. Iwabuchi’s main argument 
consists in the fact that Japan’s self-image is not, as one might think, a tool in the battle against Western cultural 
imperialism. It is in fact complicit with western ideologies of  domination (thus the term “self-orientalism”) and 
it has been employed as a strategy to suppress the country’s minorities as well as to ideologically ground the 
country’s culturally imperialistic expansionist tactics in Asia. In other words, Japan’s complicit self-orientalism 
is often utilized as an ideological tool, especially in those arenas in which the warfare tools of  soft power take 
center stage.
Discourses of  Japanese self-orientalist cultural nationalism, often based on the presupposition of  
uniqueness, have been significantly challenged by the narratives of  internal diversity and multiculturalism 
which have emerged in the last 30 years. Furthermore, ﬁgures such as the kikoku shijo and hāfu have made 
visible the presence of  individuals who cannot easily be labeled as either Japanese or “foreign”. However, some 
of  these identities have been subsumed into a newly emerging national ideology, who found in them a powerful 
tool to reimagine the nation as a hybrid between “western” modernity and “Japanese” tradition. Paradoxically, 
this ideological construction is reminiscent of  the two orientalist gazes of  traditionalism (here understood as the 
condition of  being “stuck” in a pre-modern past) and the often dehumanizing hyper-futurism (Wagenaar 2016). 
In this, we can see a continuity with the mirror-games of  self-image construction that Iwabuchi refers to.
This newly emerging discourse surrounding the nation is embodied in the selection of  the hāfu newscaster 
Takigawa Christel as Olympic ambassador – an ambassador to the nation in an extremely inter-national 
context. Takigawa stands out among the 10 Olympic ambassadors as the only one who has no direct relations to 
the sports event. There is an undeniably globalist reasoning behind her selection, that would arguably be based 
on her status as an individual who is “global” in virtue of  her “mixed-race”. Her proﬁciency in French is further 
proof  of  this “international” status.
Takigawa Christel became famous as a female newscaster for Fuji Television, where she worked until 2013 
(Suzuki, 2013)7. Viewers of  Japanese television might also be familiar with her presence in commercials. Her 
line of  work blurs the boundaries between journalist and that of  the celebrity; she could be considered as a 
tarento (TV personality) that is endowed with a high cultural capital. Thus, their image, consumable in various 
merchandising such as yearly released calendars, puts together physical beauty with the added element of  
intelligence and social status.
7 Takigawa is now an independent newscaster and animal-rights activist.
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Takigawa nowadays is perhaps more famous for her persona than her work as a broadcaste. Her image, 
which is built around her hāfu identity, her high education8 and prestigious line of  work, are tied to her 
multicultural background. Japanese individuals with white mixed-race backgrounds became increasingly well 
represented in the media since the 1970s. The word hāfu started being associated with characteristics such as 
beauty and cosmopolitanism (Iwabuchi, 2014). Contemporary discourses about hāfu are heavily inﬂuenced by 
discourses about globalization; Iwabuchi ironically remarks on how they are perceived “global not only in their 
looks but also in their way of  thought” (Iwabuchi, 2014: 12). 
Especially relevant to the construction of  her persona is her father’s country of  birth, France, often 
idealized and imbued with a high symbolic capital (Wyatt, 2017) and thus occupying a very special place in the 
network of  shared meanings of  the Japanese9. These elite connotations have landed her roles in commercials for 
high-end products such as Ebisu Beer and Shiseido make-up products, and at the same time her appearance in 
such advertisements are further reinforcing her image of  prestige. 
Takigawa’s multiculturalism plays its role into positioning her among the cultured, highly sophisticated 
upper-middle class, she is a perfect example of  the ideal global jinzai (global human resource)10. Physically, 
with her black hair and very light-coloured skin, she is the ideal proxy for an elite class who is nationalistically 
looking outwards, who aspires to be modern (and thus “westernized”) while retaining some kind of  “traditional 
Japaneseness”.
This perfectly balanced mixture between “Japanese” and foreign that allows her to be chosen as the proxy 
for a “new Japaneseness” is only possible because the physical characteristics inherited from the white side 
of  her family are tame enough to allow her to exist in the middle ground of  a spectrum that goes from “jun-
nihonjin” to foreigner. As Iwabuchi pointed out (2014), advancement in plastic surgery and make-up techniques 
has made it possible for non-mixed Japanese to obtain the semblance of  a facial structure that is racially 
ambiguous. It is hard to imagine an ambassador with no relation to sports and whose foreign looks were more 
visible than Takigawa taking center stage to culturally represent Japan as she did11. Her white heritage, upper 
socio-economical status and gender made her the perfect candidate.
Because of  her inherently “global” hāfu status and her linguistic proﬁciency, Takigawa is perceived as 
a “bridge” between the all-Japanese panel speakers and the international audience of  the IOC. She assumes 
the role of  the “internationally-oriented national economic power elite” that serves to “internationalize” the 
nationalistic endeavor of  bidding to host the 2020 Olympics (Roche, 2000); her elite status granted in virtue of  
both her profession and her biracialism. These tensions between national and international clearly emerge from 
her ambassador speech, that I will analyze in the following section.
8 Takigawa has a bachelor’s degree in French literature from Aoyama Gakuin University.
9 For the self-orientalistic construction of  the European “West” see MIYAKE, Toshio, Occidentalismi, Venezia, 
Cafoscarina, 2010, pp.103-107 (in Italian).
10 Chapple translates as following the deﬁnition of  the term given by the MEXT and the METI: 
 “people who, in today’s competitive and cooperative world, can—while maintaining their sense of  Japanese identity
—possess a broad worldview based on both general and specialized education, have communicative and cooperative 
abilities to build relationships which go beyond values, cultures and different languages, and that have the ability to 
create new values and the desire to contribute to society now and in future generations” (Chapple, 2014. Cursive in 
original.)
 As it can be inferred from the institutional deﬁnition, global jinzai are expected to be the agent of  globalization in 
Japanese companies.
11 A comparison with the media coverage that former Miss Universe Japan Ariana Miyamoto got two years later 
might be useful to illustrate this point. Her selection prompted an immediate reaction from the ultra-conservative 
population of  the 2chan boards, widely considered to be the underbelly of  Japan. Although the extreme stance 
taken by these netizens is definitely a minority opinion, the reportages of  her victory mostly focused on racial 
discrimination. One could see a faint continuity between the framing of  (especially black) konketsuji as social 
problem and Miyamoto’s media presence.
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Takigawa Christelʼs speech: the “magic word” omotenashi
Takigawa’s presentation in front of  the IOC was conducted in French and lasted approximately five 
minutes long. She was preceded by former Tokyo governor Inose Naoki, who introduced her as “the one who 
would communicate to the audience how will Tokyo welcome people from all the world” (Hufﬁngton Post Japan, 
2013). The announcer began her speech in the following way:
Tokyo will welcome you uniquely. In Japanese, we can express [the way in which Tokyo will welcome you] as 
omotenashi (Hufﬁngton Post Japan, 2013).
Since the beginning of  her speech, Tokyo, in virtue of  being the capital city of  Japan, is positioned as 
“unique”. This references the cultural nationalist Nihonjinron discourse, that in the 70s aimed to construct a 
Japanese identity deﬁned by its alterity from the “West”. Similarly, omotenashi is constructed as a traditional 
(and thus exclusive to Japan) concept, unable to be rendered in foreign words. The alien quality of  this concept 
is further emphasized by Takigawa’s gestures; she spells out every syllable with a peculiar gesture of  the 
hands, and then repeats the word once again, bowing with her hands held together as if  she was praying12. 
Overall the ﬁrst part of  the speech is the most popular one, and it is the reason why the word omotenashi was 
premiated with the “Buzzword of  the Year” award (Osumi, 2013).
That is the spirit of  hospitality without expecting anything in exchange, that has been transmitted to us 
from our ancestors and is deeply rooted in our hyper-modern culture. The word omotenashi expresses why 
Japanese people help each other and why they think that the guests they are welcoming are important.
Here, Takigawa makes a ﬁrst reference to the hybrid cultural nationalist discourse which sees Japan as a 
hyper-technological, hyper-modern society that is nonetheless spiritually connected to its traditionalist roots. 
Once again, the apparently deep links between omotenashi and “Japaneseness” are highlighted.
Takigawa then proceeds to give examples of  omotenashi.
Here is a simple example. If  by any chance you lost anything in Tokyo, you would almost certainly ﬁnd it 
back. Even money. In fact, last year more than 30 million dollars were brought back to the Tokyo Police 
Bureau as a lost item. According to a recent survey conducted on 75,000 people who travel the world, 
Tokyo is the safest city in the world. Also, according to this survey, Tokyo ranked ﬁrst even in the following 
categories: trafﬁc safety, cleanliness, and the kindness of  the taxi drivers.
Safety is a priority concern when organizing mega-events, and they can even become catalysts to pass 
new security laws. Here Takigawa is appealing to this, describing Japan’s safe environment as directly related 
to its unique culture. In what could be presented as a twist on the “futuristic” variant of  Japanese nationalism, 
the country is presented as an unbelievably hyper-safe environment. She then goes on to describe what in the 
nihonjinron discourse is presented as the reason behind Japan’s uniqueness.
You can observe these resources in every neighborhood. The traditional oriental culture. Together with top 
class occidental shopping and restaurants they are in this town, who has the most Michelin stars in the 
12 A video of  the speech is available on ANN news’s Youtube channel at the following link. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6hggygKWwhg (accessed on ??, ??, 201?)
96
Journal of  International and Advanced Japanese Studies      University of  Tsukuba Volume 11 / February 2019
world; everything is incorporated in the landscape of  this futuristic city. (my emphasis).
Here Takigawa slightly changes the topic, going back to the motif  of  hybridity. In a (self)orientalist twist, 
Japan is presented as being the perfect union between “oriental” and “occidental” cultures, providing to the 
visiting tourist exotic Japanese entertainment while at the same time offering them the safety of  the already 
known. Following the reasoning behind her presentation, it is this co-existence of  exotic “oriental tradition” 
and “foreign innovation” that makes Tokyo “futuristic”. It can be argued that these words have an even 
more powerful impact when pronounced by someone that is herself the union between the “oriental” and the 
“occidental”.     
Takigawa’s hybrid, biracial image resonates with the nationalistic ideology as she is conﬂated to what is 
being constructed as the idealized “futuristic Japan”: the biracial body becomes the ﬂesh for the multicultural, 
hybrid nationalist ideology tailor-made for the age of  globalization. In the international space of  competition 
that is the Olympic bid, the physical thus becomes a mirroring representation of  the ideological.
The Elite Biracial Body as Proxy for “Future Japaneseness”
Being frequently featured in television, both as a newscaster and as a tarento featured in commercials, 
Takigawa is very well known to the audience of  Japanese television. Her multicultural background, high 
proﬁle announcer career and her endorsement of  high-end products mutually reinforce themselves, creating 
the image of  an elite superwoman. By choosing her as the ambassador for the 2020 Olympics, the Japanese 
Olympics Committee, backed by the government, has chosen the “face” of  Japan that it wanted to show on 
an international arena. Takigawa Christel’s biracialism, far from being subversive, becomes the embodiment 
of  the cultural strategy of  blending new and old, “oriental” and “occidental”, and constructing it into a new 
national(istic) self-identity. Takigawa’s presentation was incredibly successful nation-wide; it could be assumed 
that part of  this success derives from the fact that she herself  is constructed as the perfect mirror for the 
nationalist discourse in the subtext of  the words she was addressing to the IOC.
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